經理人薪酬、公司治理與現金股利政策

Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Cash Dividend Policy

公司的股利政策一向是投資者關注焦點。本研究從經理人薪酬及公司治理的觀點出發，探討台灣上市公司其經理人薪酬水準與公司治理機制對公司現金股利政策之影響。即欲驗證公司給予經理人薪酬的高低和公司治理中董事會機能及股權結構監督制衡機制，能否促使公司內部人之利益與外部人一致，進而提高現金股利發放的水準，以降低代理問題的嚴重性。本研究以2004年至2009年在台灣證券交易所掛牌上市之公司作為研究對象，有效樣本共計2885個。實證發現，經理人薪酬的多寡和股利支付水準呈現正向關聯性。而且較高的經理人持股比率、主動機構持股比率與獨立董事比率也會提升股利支付水準，顯示了經理人薪酬越多與公司治理機制愈好，的確會促使企業支付越高現金股利水準。此外，本研究更發現，在國內以家族企業為大宗的情況下，最終控制股東之現金流量權與股份控制權偏離越大時，會傾向增加現金股利的發放來免除外部投資者對企業的經營疑慮。故O/C愈低（現金流量權與股份控制權偏離程度愈大）則現金股利發放水準會愈高。

Investors always care about the Dividend policy of companies. We investigate whether the structure of executives' compensation and a corporate governance mechanism is associated with cash dividend policy of listed companies in Taiwan or not. It also examines whether executives' compensation level, board function and ownership structure can mitigate these agency problems, and then increased dividend payout. The data is chose from listed companies in Taiwan stock exchange market during 2004 to 2009 and the research reach a total of 2885 firms. Empirical results indicate that executive compensation is associated with higher dividend payouts. In other words, the better aligning the interests of management and shareholders, could result in a higher level of dividend payouts. Furthermore, it also indicates that the biggest managers' ownership, active institutional investors' ownership and independent board membership are, the more dividends pay out. In addition, it is negative correlation of the deviation extent of shareholder cash flow rights and controlling rights with cash dividend payouts.