英文摘要 |
Previous research in the area of corporate governance finds that the deviation between cash flow and voting rights (a measurement of ”bad” governance) could result in a company with lower Tobin-q. One possible explanation is that the earnings quality of the ”bad” companies is lower, and consequently, the stock market reacts accordingly. This raises our first research issue- whether the persistence of discretionary accruals is lower in those of ”bad” firms. Following the first issue, our second issue is regarding the stock market reaction to the discretionary accruals. We test whether the stock market reaction of discretionary accruals is related to the deviation between cash flow and voting rights.We find strong evidence supporting the hypotheses that bad governance leads to less persistence of discretionary accruals. As to the empirical result from the Mishkin test, the evidence suggests that (1) the market overreacts to discretionary accruals, and (2) the degree of overreaction is decrease for ”bad” companies, but on average, the market still overreacts to discretionary accruals. |