英文摘要 |
In contrast to the domestic institutional and individual investors, foreign investors play a rather important role in Taiwan's capital market. As the concentration of corporate ownership has created agency conflicts between controlling owners and minority shareholders in Taiwan, the primary purpose of this paper is to explore the association between foreign investment ownership and ownership structure, as measured by the divergence between the ultimate controlling owner's voting rights and cash flow rights, the percentage of board members affiliated with the controlling owners, and the extent of shares collateralized by the board of directors. Our empirical results show that foreign investors hold fewer shares for firm with higher control divergence. Second, foreign investment ownership is negatively related to the percentage of controlling owner's seats on the board, as predicted. Third, we find that foreign institutional investors hold fewer shares on firms with a greater extent of shares collateralized by the board of directors. The results are robust to the alternative model specifications, including Heckman selection and simultaneous models. Our results remain qualitatively unchanged using alternative proxy for foreign investment ownership. |