英文摘要 |
The real estate market in Taiwan implements two types of auction. The court auction uses the first price sealed-bid, whereas the bank auction applies the open-outcry bidding. Taiwan real estate auction is unique in the world because its objects are non-performing assets and its operation is bound by laws. This study tried to investigate the differences of auction prices, floor prices and operation efficiencies between the court and bank auction markets in Taiwan. Our empirical results suggest that discrepancy in price setting is the major cause for the fact that bank auction price is lower than court auction price. However, when the floor prices for these two markets are adjusted to the same level, the bank auction price is 2.83% higher than the court auction price. The small discrepancy in the auction price might be due to a low competition in the bank auction market and information asymmetry among buyers. We also found that the bank auction is more efficient to clear non-performing assets. |