不同拍賣機制對不良資產價格之影響

A Study of Influence of Different Auction Mechanism to No-performing Assets

目前國內不動產市場的法拍與銀拍屋分屬第一價位密封投標拍賣以及英式拍賣制度，不同於國外不動產拍賣主要是以正常資產為標的，國內的標的乃是不良債權不動產抵押品，不僅產品本質較特殊，其處分也因受到法令限制使得市場結構及訂價制度與國外不同。因此本文希望能瞭解國內不良資產在不同拍賣制度下拍定價格的差異性、底價制度差異對於拍賣結果的影響，以及不同拍賣機制對於處分不良資產的效率表現。研究發現兩市場底價訂定的差異是造成銀拍屋市場拍定價低於法拍屋的主因。當校估兩市場底價至同一水準後，可發現銀拍屋拍定價格實較法拍屋溢價2.83%，而兩者間價差有限則是由於競爭程度不足，使得銀拍屋的競價功能未完全發揮以及法拍屋市場存在買方訊息不對稱所致。此外實證也發現銀拍屋市場能有效的降低訊息不對稱的現象，是一較有效率的拍賣機制。

The real estate market in Taiwan implements two types of auction. The court auction uses the first price sealed-bid, whereas the bank auction applies the open-outcry bidding. Taiwan real estate auction is unique in the world because its objects are non-performing assets and its operation is bound by laws. This study tried to investigate the differences of auction prices, floor prices and operation efficiencies between the court and bank auction markets in Taiwan. Our empirical results suggest that discrepancy in price setting is the major cause for the fact that bank auction price is lower than court auction price. However, when the floor prices for these two markets are adjusted to the same level, the bank auction price is 2.83% higher than the court auction price. The small discrepancy in the auction price might be due to a low competition in the bank auction market and information asymmetry among buyers. We also found that the bank auction is more efficient to clear non-performing assets.