| 英文摘要 |
Prior to the American acquisition of the Philippines following her so-called “splendid little war”with Spain in 1898, American policy in the Far East as developed from the early decades of the nineteenth century was always based on: two related principles: equal commercial opportunity and most-favored-nation treatment. A policy of “hitch-hiking” imperialism as termed by Professor Alexander DeConde, following the British leadership in China and accepting the results of all European imperialist priveleges and rights curbed from China, American interests in China were generally centered on its commercial establishments and missionary enterprises in the treaty ports and elsewhere. This situation, however, changed drastically after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. China‘s defeat in that war with Japan was followed by an intense competition among the great European powers for financial, industrial, railway and mining concessions, leased sea-ports and“ sphere of influence”, etc. A “Battle of Concessions” among them in China was begun, and the U. S. also joined it fervently. For a period before 1900, the international competition in pursuing the railway concessions resulted to the fact that Germany won the building right of the Tsinan-Tsingtao railway and other projected lines in Shantung; Russia obtained the trans-Manchurian railways together with its“ branch” north-south line to Ports Arthur and Dairen; France was assigned to construct the Peking-Hankow railway (through the nominal cover of the Belgians), the Tongking-Yunnanfu railway and other lines in Kwangsi;and the British achieved the largest share of the whole “melon”, including a trunk line from Tientsin to Chinkiang, a line from the Shansi-Honan border to P‘uk‘on on the northern bank of the Yangtze River near Nanking, a line from P‘uK‘ou to Sinyang on the Peking-HanKow railway, the Canton-Kowloon railway, the Shanghai-Nanking railway and the Soochow-Hangchow-Ningpo railway. |
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