Facebook社交網站使用因素之量表發展與驗證

Facebook Motivation Scale: Development and Validation

本研究考慮單一製造商面對著傳統通路（零售商）和直接銷售通路（網路商店）的多通路結構之下，討論網路商店進入前後，對零售商與製造商定價策略的影響。網路商店尚未進入市場時，製造商及零售商間存在著Stackelberg game 領導者及跟隨者的關係。在網路商店進入該市場後，網路商店成為市場的領導者，決定最適營收分享比例。製造商同時透過網路商店直接販售商品或是透過傳統零售商進行販售，此時兩通路結構的價格將交互影響。換句話說，製造商不僅供應零售商產品，也會變成競爭對手。透過Stackelberg 均衡分析達到最大利潤的訂價策略，並觀察兩通路成員的價格與利潤高低，來提供決策者做決策考量。數值上驗證發現當網路商店進入競爭市場後的零售商訂價會低於網路商店未進入市場之前，而且網路售價會比實體零售價格低。在利潤方面，有網路商店下的競爭市場會有較高的整體利潤表現，而零售商利潤會降低、但是製造商卻會提高。雖然網路商店進入會使實體零售商受到壓力，但如果製造商提供一個優惠的批發價給零售商，可以讓零售商的利潤提高。製造商會有所損失但是還是會比沒有競爭環境下的利潤來的高。當消費者對於市場的價格差異敏感度高時，價格會成一定比例的下降，且有利於製造商的利潤、而不利於零售商。

We consider the problem of one manufacturer selling one product in the market through two competing channels: a physical channel (retailer) and a direct channel (internet store). We focus our analysis to study the effect of the dual-channel pricing on the retailer and manufacturer when facing an internet store entry. We use a game-theoretical approach and the sequence of moves in the Stackelberg game. The internet store is the Stackelberg leader who provides a revenue-sharing contract to the manufacturer. The manufacturer will decide his price of internet channel, and the retailer will decide his price of traditional retail channel. We study the profits and prices of the retailer and manufacturer when facing an internet store entry and analyze the effects of key parameters on their profits and price by numerical example. Numerical results show that the retailer and manufacturer both generate lower prices and the manufacturer have better profit than before. The retailer’s profit would be better due to the manufacturer offers a lower wholesale price. When the cross-price sensitivity is increasing, the retailer and manufacturer’s prices is decreasing and lower manufacturer’s profit.