英文摘要 |
Recently, smart cards with electronic-purse (e-purse) applications have been a new payment option in multiple industries. In Taiwan, the scale of such smart card usage is still limited. One of the key factors is the incompatibility among the e-purse payment systems. In this paper, we consider two kinds of e-purse applications used in transportation services industries and at authorized merchant stores, respectively. We investigate compatibility in which kind of application between the duopoly issuing banks' e-purse payment systems are the most profitable. We also examine the welfare-maximizing compatibility cases. We show that the equilibrium industry profits of the issuing banks are the highest when the payment systems are completely compatible on both transportation services and on merchant services, or when they are (partially) compatible only on merchant services. The social-welfare optimal policy is to impose complete compatibility on both applications, whereas the consumer-welfare optimal policy is to impose compatibility only on transportation services. |