Cost System Choice for Co-opetition Members in a Virtual Enterprise with Knowledge Asymmetries

知識不對稱下虛擬企業競合成員之成本制度選擇

虛擬企業競合成員仍面臨許多問題有待進一步研究。本研究解決Mishira and Vaysman (2001)所提出的一些問題，並考慮虛擬企業中的兩個成員，一為發起者，另一為參與者；伴隨成員間與成員內的知識不對稱，探討虛擬企業成員的成本制度選擇決策作業基礎成本制與傳統成本制。主要結果是：(1)虛擬企業成員間的利益互有抵換關係。透過納許均衡的方法來探討競合成員的成本制度似乎是合理的。(2)納許均衡總是發生在成員內與成員兼具有較大之成員內與成員間的知識不對稱。換言之，兩成員都採用作業基礎成本制，可降低成員內與成員間的知識不對稱。(3)當我們設定一個成員有較大知識區間，另一成員為較小的知識區間，則較大知識區間的成員應當採取作業基礎成本制，而較小知識區間的成員應當採取傳統成本制。(3)已知一個競合成員的知識區間與成本制度，則另一成員採用作業基礎成本制將可縮小成員內知識不對稱，且將產生較高之期望利潤。本研究將採用數值分析來闡述建議的模型。

The co-opetition (collaboration and competition) members in a virtual enterprise still have many aftereffects to be studied. Several questions mentioned by Mishira and Vaysman (2001) are resolved in this paper. Considering two members in a virtual enterprise, one originator and one participator, the cost system choice for the VE members are explored with the intra- and inter-member knowledge asymmetry (KA)-activity-based costing (ABC) vs. traditional system. The main results are that: (i) There is a trade-off relationship among VE members' benefits. It seems reasonable to consider cost system choice decision for both coopetition members through the avenue of Nash equilibrium. (ii) The Nash equilibrium always occurs when both members adopt ABC with larger intra- and inter-member knowledge uncertainties. In other words, both members adopt ABC system could moderate the intra-and inter-member KA. (iii) When we set a knowledge interval to be larger for one member and a knowledge interval to be smaller for the other, one member with higher intra-member KA will adopt ABC and the other will adopt traditional system with lower intra-member KA. (iv) Given one co-opetition member's cost system choice and knowledge interval, it is also demonstrated that the other member adopting ABC system will moderate intra-member KA and further generate higher expected profits. Numerical analyses are provided to illustrate the proposed models.