高管薪酬、政治晉升與大陸銀行業績相關性研究

Compensation, Political promotions and bank performance in Mainland China

依據2000至2012年66家中國大陸商業銀行的資料，本文實證分析了銀行高管政治晉升激勵對銀行業績的影響。在控制了薪酬激勵之後，本文發現銀行高管政治晉升激勵對業績並沒有顯著影響。這在一定程度上說明，銀行高管政治晉升激勵對銀行業績的影響，並不如政府官員政治晉升激勵對GDP影響那麼明顯。本文認為中國大陸銀行薪酬機制的市場化改革為銀行高管放棄政治追求提供了貨幣補償管道，這使得政治晉升激勵被部分貨幣激勵所替代。

This paper investigates the impact of bank top executive political promotion incentives on performance with data of sixty-six commercial banks from 2000 to 2012 in Mainland China. We find that bank top executive political promotions have no impacts on bank performance when compensation incentives and other determinants are controlled for. This suggests the impact of bank top executive's political promotions on performance is not as significant as that of government official. We argue that the market-oriented compensation reforms of banks in Mainland China provide possible money to complement their abandoning political pursue. In other words, the political promotion incentive of top executives is substituted by the compensation.