以賽局理論建構船員僱傭關係之研究

Game-theoretically Modeling of the Employment Relationship for Seafarers

過去學者在討論船員僱傭契約的問題時，多以僱傭契約的法律層面作為討論重點。而賽局理論對契約與法律之間的分析能夠探討調整參與者的信念與行為，以達成較合理的一致性結果。因此本研究試著應用賽局理論中契約強制執行與損害賠償的觀念，藉由單一貨櫃航線勞資雙方的情況，探討航運業者面對船員僱傭契約的處理方式。本研究用簽訂契約與執行契約兩個構面進行契約關係之分類。在不同的簽訂契約結構（自我強制與外部強制），我們可以發現船員在簽約後所獲致的利潤與契約完全與否的因素有關。而在不同的執行契約結構（期望賠償原則、信賴賠償原則與歸還損害賠償原則），我們可以發現法院可依據適當的法律原則，填補契約認知的差距，以落實契約之執行。

Over the years, the problems of seafarer contract were usually dealt with the legal characteristics of seafarer contract problems. Game theory is the most unique one in that it would be able to align beliefs and behavior to achieve congruous outcomes. Consequently, this study is intended to make use of contracting with breach remedies and enforcement in static game theory concept through a single container route within profit sharing between employer and employee to further focus the seafarer contract problems faced by shipping companies. The study categorizes contractual relationship by applying two distinct dimensions, namely, contracting and implementation. At contracting structure dimension, which can further divided into self-enforced and externally enforced domains； it is generally found that there is a relationship between the profit earned and incomplete contracting. While at implementation dimension, which can further divided into expectation, reliance, and restitution damages remedy principles, we found that courts will be able to fill in the gaps on the basis of certain legal principles.