真實性狀態、情感與知識

Factive State, Emotion and Knowledge

戈登（Gordon，1969）主張情感分成「排除知識的」以及「蘊涵知識的」兩類，而情感語詞具有相應的語意特性，使情感歸屬句要嘛蘊涵知識歸屬句，要嘛與知識歸屬句不一致。知識論上的不可錯論者（infallibilists）認為，語句如「S希望p，而且S知道p」，或者「S因p而傷心，但S不知道p」是不恰當的（infelicitous），其不恰當性可透過戈登的情感分類予以解釋，並宣稱可錯論者（fallibilists）無法恰當解釋這些語言材料。在這篇文章中，我會說明不可錯論者的攻擊策略依賴於前述的情感二分框架，但我將論證「排除知識的」或「蘊涵知識的」的相應語意特性都會遭遇困難，以削弱不可錯論者的攻擊力道。

Gordon, R. (1969) claims that any emotions either require knowledge or preclude knowledge, and emotion terms have semantic properties such that emotion attributions either entail knowledge attributions or are inconsistent with them. In recent debates of epistemology, friends of infallibilism show that, conjunctions like ''S hopes that p and S knows that p'' or ''S is upset that p but S doesn't know that p'' are infelicitous. They argue that such infelicity can be explained in terms of semantic inconsistency within Gordon's framework, and suggest that fallibilists can't provide any satisfying account for those linguistic data. In this paper, I show that the infallibilists' challenge heavily depends on the dichotomous view of emotions, and argue that the semantic properties of emotion terms in question will in turn bring difficulties to infallibilism.