市場盈餘預測誤差會影響美國銀行業之盈餘管理行為嗎？

Do the Market Analysts’ Earnings Forecast Errors Matter with Earnings Management in the U.S. Banking Industry?

過去文獻證實美國銀行業存在盈餘管理行為，而這些盈餘管理行為是否因為財測誤差而進行，為本文探討重點，以往學者針對一般產業研究，發現實際營運狀況與市場分析師的預測產生落差時，公司管理者會產生向上盈餘管理的動機，但盈餘管理的目的是否為了達到市場預期而進行的操弄行為，需進一步檢驗公司向上盈餘管理之後，是否能真正打敗市場預期，若是，則證實盈餘管理的動機確為達到市場預期而作的操弄行為，本研究即以銀行業為樣本，區分管理前與管理後與市場預期差距，檢驗是否銀行業存在以符合市場預期動機而進行盈餘的操弄。銀行業屬管制性產業，其盈餘管理動機多為符合資本管制與平穩化收入為主，過去文獻已多有著墨，惟對其是否以達到市場預期而進行盈餘管理，並未有文獻探討，因此，本研究以 2001 至 2004年間美國銀行業為樣本，運用 logit 模型檢驗銀行向上盈餘管理是否與達到市場預期動機有關。本文實證結果顯示，當銀行事前觀察到與市場預期落差較大時，從事向上盈餘管理的可能性較高，此結果與以往文獻結果一致，但本文發現向上管理的銀行在從事盈餘管理後，卻較不可能打敗市場預期，因此，本文並未發現有足夠證據顯示美國銀行業有符合市場預期為其操弄盈餘的動機。此外，本文研究結果推論銀行業仍然以平穩化收入為其盈餘管理主要動機。 Previous studies support that earnings management does exist in the U.S. banking industry. Is this earnings manipulation driven by achieving zero or small positive earnings surprise? A number of past studies show that firms tend to manage earnings upward when they observe they are unable to meet analyst’s forecast. To verify meeting analyst’s forecast for upward earnings management, there is a need to further address the issue that firms should tend to beat the analyst’s forecast after earnings are managed upward. Past related studies did not distinct the ex ante and ex post earnings deviate from the market earnings forecast, and also mainly focused on non-financial industries. In this study, we examine whether meeting market forecasts drive the banking industry engaged in upward earnings management. Thus, this research tries to provide answer for it empirically by employing logit model to investigate the relationship between bank’s earnings management and market analyst’s earnings forecast in the U.S. commercial banks during period 2001 and 2004. In consistent with previous research, we present that bank also tends to manage earnings upward when they ex ante observe greater deviation from the market forecasts. However, our results further show that banks are unlikely to beat the market expectations after managing earnings upward. Thus, we conclude that there is not enough evidences to show the earnings management in the U.S. banking industry driven by meeting market expectations. Finally, our results imply that the income-smoothing might provide alternative motivation for earnings management of banks.