兩類不完美訊息下，金融中介與廠商融資決策之研究

Financial Intermediation and Firms' Financing Choices under Double Information Imperfection

本文提出一個含有兩類不完美訊息的模型，假設市場對公司的真實類型(好公司或壞公司)以及產業的真實前景(看好或不佳)並無充分訊息之下，探討廠商融資管道的選擇。研究發現，倘如金融中介於努力擷取兩類訊息時，係優先處理其具有相對優勢的訊息，則對於高品質(指為好公司的機率大)或低品質(指為好公司的機率小)的公司融資透過投資銀行較為有利；而中等品質的公司向商業銀行融資較為有利。此外隨著產業前景的變化，兩類融資管道的市場規模可能擴大或者萎縮，須視該產業前景的初始狀態而定。最後，當金融中介可內部化決定處理兩類訊息的最佳順序時，兩類融資管道的相對競爭優勢也將產生變化。 This paper proposes a model to analyze the optimal financing choices for firms in a structure that has imperfect information on both the firm’s type and the state of the industry. Assuming that intermediaries start with the production of information that is to their relative advantage, it is discovered that firms with mid-level quality attempt to access commercial bank lending while those with relatively high or low quality levels tend to pursue capital market financing. Moreover, the market share secured by each type of financing may expand or shrink as in- dustry prospects change, depending on the industry’s initial prospects. Finally, each interme- diary is allowed to decide on its optimal sequencing of information production and the impact of sequencing on the intermediary’s competitive status for serving the firm’s financing needs is examined.