| 中文摘要 |
根據代理理論，公司管理者通常會進行次佳的投資決策以追求私利，而具有高度資訊不對稱的創新決策往往成為公司內部人遂行自利的有利管道。據此，本研究聚焦於股權集中所衍生的控制股東代理問題，探討其對公司創新之績效與市場評價的影響。鑑於台灣資訊電子業提供一個理想情境可供檢測此項議題，本研究以 1997-2004 年的電子業上市櫃為樣本進行實證分析。結果發現，隨著控制股東控制權與所有權愈偏離，公司創新活動之績效與市場評價愈低，顯示控制股東之代理問題對於創新活動之成效具有負面影響。亦即，管理者能否有效運用及管理這些創新投資的經濟資源而使公司獲益，實與控制股東之剝奪誘因有關。
Given the relatively large extent of information asymmetry associated with innovation activity, corporate executives can and often do exploit this asymmetry to make suboptimal innovation investments for their own utilities at the expense of outside shareholders. Hence, the innovation outcomes may be different across firms according to the level of firms’ agency problems. In emerging markets, the majority of public firms exhibit concentrated ownership in the hands of a controlling shareholder. Such an ownership structure leads to the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This agency problem is different from that between managers and shareholders for the U.S. firms with disperse ownership. When the divergence in control and ownership is greater, a controlling shareholder has more incentives to extract private benefits, thereby reducing firm value and expropriating the minority shareholders’ wealth. In light of this, the present study aims to examine how a controlling shareholder’s expropriation incentive affects the performance and market valuation of corporate innovation. Using a sample of the electronics firms listed on the TSE or trading on Taiwan’s OTC market from 1997 to 2004, this study finds that innovation performance is negatively associated with the degree of divergence in a controlling shareholder’s control and his/her ownership. Furthermore, the evidence shows that this divergence has a negative effect on the market valuation of corporate innovation. These findings indicate that the managerial effectiveness of economic resources invested in innovation activities depends highly on the level of agency problems arising from controlling shareholders. |
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