儒學也能推導出現代法治原則嗎?:以「道德自主性」為中心的探討

Can We Deduce the Principle of Rule of Law from Confucianism? An Analysis Based on the Conception of Moral Autonomy

本文探討儒學傳統在「聖王之治」理想之下的人治格局，是否亦有可能經由新的詮釋，創造性地轉化為現代普遍規則之治的法治思維與論述。本文檢視西方自由主義的法治論證、從洛克立基於人的理性以論法治之下的自由；肇端於盧梭「普遍意志」，經康德轉化而落實為「無條件律令」之道德自主性法治論證；以迄維爾斯祈嚮由理性的自律主體所構成合乎正義原則之法治國家。透過比較分析，本文嘗試從儒家孟子以迄陸象山、王陽明此一心學脈絡，進行普遍法則之治可能資源的挖掘。本文指出，就思想內在理路而言，從孟子性善論、陸象山「心即理」到王陽明「致良知」的道德哲學，在中國歷史脈絡中固然導向德治仁政的人治格局；然而與西方近代自由主義立基於「道德自主性」的法治論證對比分析，其實可以發掘出儒家心學傳統中亦蘊含充沛的「道德自主性」觀念內涵，得以推導出現代法治原則。

In this paper, I would like to investigate the issue whether it is possible to deduce the principle of rule of law from Confucianism. Admittedly, instead of ”rule of law”, the ideal state is ”rule of sage-king” in traditional China. Nevertheless, the point is whether it is possible to seek the resources for the justifications of rule of law in Confucianism by a new interpretation or so-called 'creative transformation'. Through the comparative analyses with the justifications of rule of law in liberalism, such as Lock's 'liberty under the rule of law' based on human reason, the transformation from Rousseau's 'general will' to Kant's 'categorical imperative', and Rawls's principles of justice which are analogous to categorical imperative, I indicate we could deduce the principle of rule of law from idealistic Confucianism which originated from Mencius, through Sung-Ming to contemporary neo-Confucianism. As the justifications of rule of universal law, Mencius's ”human nature is good”, Lu Hsiang-shan's ”mind is principles” and Wang Yang-ming's chih liang-chih are all based on the conception of moral autonomy. From this viewpoint, I conclude that it seems possible to deduce the principle of rule of law from Confucianism.