論漢娜.鄂蘭的制憲權理念

On Hannah Arendt's Theory of Pouvoir Constituant

制憲權力的探討，是個根本的政治學理的課題。制憲與修憲不同。修憲的正當性與權力來自於憲法，但制憲不可能來自於此。制憲只發生在兩種情況：l)新國家、新憲法；2)國家廢棄舊憲法，另制新憲。無論任何一種，制憲權力都不可能來自憲法。這不但是法理如此，更是事實。德國憲法學家卡爾•施密特的制憲權理論指出，制憲權乃一赤裸裸的權力，是從無到有的創造意志。這個權力，與主權概念密不可分，從政治神學到現代政治原理，從君王主權到國民主權皆然。施密特強調這個權力的實然存在，並從國家廢棄舊憲另訂新憲的實例來證明制憲權力不受憲法拘束或解消的事實。漢娜•鄂蘭與施密特有著相同的出發點：制憲權力不可能受憲法的拘束。不過，鄂蘭與施密特不同之處在於：鄂蘭從美國的政治史經驗發現，制憲權力確實不受憲法的拘束，但在一個具有民主素養的國家中，它很可能受到民主政治文化所孕育出的民主精神與協商共識方式所限制，儘管這一切並無具體的法規以為依據。鄂蘭揚棄法國政治神學式的思考，轉向古希臘羅馬的政治思考之原因在於，擺脫追尋超越性根源的高級法，也因此擺脫了此所造成的惡性循環。古希臘羅馬的政治思考提供的素材是，自律式的自主創建是可能的，也是真實發生過的歷史經驗。鄂蘭的理論對台灣社會所提供的資源是：儘管制憲權是一種力量，儘管無任何憲法規約之；但在一個既有民主政治文化並宣揚主權在民的國家中，政治行動者們先行協商出一致同意的程序、並依據民主原則與程序進行制憲，仍舊是必要的。

The inquiry of the idea of pouvoir constituant is a very important issue in political theory. The action of constitution-making is different from that of constitution amendment. In the case of the action of constitution amendment, its power and legitimacy come from pouvoir constitué, but it is not so in the case of the action of constitution-making. The action of constitution-making can take place in two occasions only: 1) the creation of a new state and its new constitution; 2) a country abandons its old constitution and creates a new one. In neither cases, pouvoir constituant can come from pouvoir constitué. According to Carl Schmitt's theory of constitution-making, pouvoir constituant is a pure power, a will to create from nothing. Such power is intimately connected with the idea of sovereignty, and this connection can be found in both the political theology and monarch sovereignty and the principle of modern polity and popular sovereignty. Schmitt emphasized the actual existence of this power, and argued for the unconstrainability and indissolubility of pouvoir constituant by referring to the examples of nations which abandoned their old constitutions and created new ones. Hannah Arendt shared the same starting point with Schmitt. She agreed that pouvoir constituant is not constrained by pouvoir constitué. However, she and Schmitt did differ upon one point. Through her study of American political history, Arendt found that pouvoir constituant, being unconstrained by pouvoir constitué, could very much likely be constrained by the democratic spirit and ways of deliberation fostered by the political culture in a mature democracy. Arendt gave up the mode of thinking of French political theology and turned to that of ancient Greece and Rome, intending to get rid of the vicious circle by giving up the search for higher laws with transcendental origins. The lesson she learned from the political histories of ancient Greece and Rome was that the self-disciplined autonomous creation is both possible and had actually happened in history. Arendt's theory provides a theoretical resource to Taiwanese society. It reveals that the action of constitution-making should not appeal to pure power, despite that such power is a legitimate one and is unconstrained by any pouvoir constitué. In a nation with an established democratic culture and a popular sovereignty claim, it is still necessary to undertake the action of constitution-making by negotiating an unanimously agreed procedure in advance and proceed according to it and the rules of democracy.