

Angle

CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Key Findings and Recommended Actions

Key Findings

- 1) Chinese Taipei provides good quality constructive assistance for international cooperation requests received in relation to ML, predicates and asset restraint and forfeiture. Such assistance is provided by Chinese Taipei generally in a timely fashion
- 2) The assistance Chinese Taipei provided and sought comprises of a variety of international cooperation requests, including formal MLA, financial intelligence, supervisory, LEA and other forms of international cooperation.
- 3) Chinese Taipei, to date, has not received any incoming extradition requests while it has sent three outgoing extradition requests. Chinese Taipei has an extradition treaty with twelve jurisdictions and the majority of the requests have been executed in the form of repatriation or deportation. Under the Cross-Strait Joint-Fight against Crime and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (2009), repatriation and deportation of wanted individuals has been achieved between Chinese Taipei and China.
- 4) The efforts of LEAs in actively seeking international cooperation including repatriation of locals has resulted in perpetrators being prosecuted and convicted along with criminal asset seizure outside of Chinese Taipei.
- 5) Chinese Taipei seeks assistance in an appropriate and timely manner to pursue domestic predicates, however, it is not sufficiently proactive with pursuing international assistance in ML matters.
- 6) Chinese Taipei routinely uses other forms of international cooperation in a proper and timely manner. Chinese Taipei maintains a network of LEA representatives overseas (including MJIB, Customs and FSC) who seek and coordinate international cooperation. This assists with overcoming long-standing challenges to obtaining assistance and has further contributed to Chinese Taipei authorities assisting and obtaining assistance from foreign counterparts in a more dynamic and effective manner.
- 7) Overall the assistance provided and sought through other forms of cooperation is consistent with the risk profile of Chinese Taipei. Chinese Taipei's LEAs play an active role in sharing information spontaneously with their foreign counterparts.
- 8) Chinese Taipei shares basic and BO information of legal persons and arrangements, however, it can only share information that is available under Chinese Taipei law. LEAs including the AMLD have actively sought international cooperation for beneficial ownership information from foreign counterparts in keeping with the risk profile.

Recommended Actions

- a) Continue to apply an increased focus on international cooperation, in particular in relation to LEAs actively transnational aspects of key risk areas of drug trafficking, smuggling and also underground banking channels.
- b) Consider proactively seeking information related to ML offences when a MLA request is sent to a

foreign jurisdiction regarding predicate offenses.

- c) FSC should further consider and respond to specific transnational risk when planning and undertaking international cooperation, including sharing risk information related to fit and proper checking and on the planning and conduct of supervision.

454. The relevant Immediate Outcome considered and assessed in this chapter is IO2. The recommendations relevant for the assessment of effectiveness under this section are R.36-40.

Immediate Outcome 2 (International Cooperation)

455. Chinese Taipei has a sound legal framework and related mechanisms for international cooperation both through the formal and informal channels of cooperation. Assistance broadly covers evidence gathering, investigation, inquiry, prosecution, restraint/seizure and forfeiture of assets, provision and serving of documents, transfer of persons in custody for testimonial purposes, locating persons and other proceedings on criminal matters.


456. Chinese Taipei's assessments of risk have considered many elements of transnational threats, however there remain some weaknesses with understanding and consideration of foreign threats, including criminal proceeds from China (see IO 1). These gaps in understanding and responding to some aspects of transnational risks apply to criminal justice, financial supervisory and regulatory areas. This resulted in less-focused cooperation on drug and smuggling offenses and related ML.

457. An important contextual issue is that Chinese Taipei faces broad and long-standing challenges to receiving international cooperation from foreign jurisdictions. Chinese Taipei demonstrated wide ranging efforts to find practical ways to overcome these challenges. Chinese Taipei actively uses FIU international cooperation channels to help to improve cooperation with non-FIU foreign counterparts. A large number of Chinese Taipei LEA attachés or liaison officers are stationed globally to support international cooperation in many dimensions, which significantly increased the opportunities for direct engagement with foreign counterparts and enhanced the efficiency of international cooperation. FSC participates in a wider range of technical cooperation bodies, and provides further practical support through foreign liaison officers and regular foreign engagement.

Providing constructive and timely MLA and extradition, seeking timely legal assistance to pursue domestic ML, associated predicate and TF cases with transnational elements

458. Chinese Taipei provides high quality constructive assistance for international cooperation requests related to ML and asset restraint and forfeiture.

459. MOJ's Department of International and Cross Strait Affairs is Chinese Taipei's Central Authority for providing and seeking formal international cooperation in criminal matters including extradition. A formal request under a mutual legal assistance treaty or agreement (MLAT/A) will be sent directly to MOJ, and in the absence of a MLAT/A, a written request via diplomatic channels on the basis of reciprocity can be sent to Chinese Taipei's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). After the enactment of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act on May 2, 2018, a written request based on the principle of reciprocity, if urgent, can be directly transmitted between MOJ and foreign courts or relevant prosecutorial or law enforcement authorities while a request that lacks urgency is still routed via both MOJ and MOFA. MOJ is also a member of ARIN-AP and the point of contact for Chinese Taipei in asset recovery work.



460. Chinese Taipei currently has MLAT/A with four countries and extradition treaties/agreements with 6 countries.

461. The assistance Chinese Taipei provided and sought comprises of a variety of international cooperation requests, including formal MLA, financial intelligence, supervisory, law LEA and other forms of international cooperation.

462. MOJ maintains a rudimentary electronic case management system and conducts request reviews on a priority basis. In placing priority on the requests, MOJ will take a number of factors into consideration. One example is if the request is urgent, assets seizure requests usually will be given priority since the assets may be dissipated quickly. Other factors include the level of severity of the offenses identified in the requests and the likely social impact of the case. The case management system handles both MLA and extradition requests.

463. Assistance provided by Chinese Taipei is generally timely. The duration of the time for responding to MLA requests varies, hinging upon the clarity of the incoming requests received from the foreign jurisdictions, the complexity of the issues, and the information sought or the action requested by other jurisdictions. The average timeframe to complete a MLA request for all cases including requests transmitted under a bilateral MLA agreement or via diplomatic channels is about 4.5 months. The majority of feedback from FATF and FSRB indicated that MLAs by Chinese Taipei were being provided in a timely manner.

464. A MLA request seeking coercive measures can only be executed if dual criminality is present while a lack of the dual criminality will not impact execution of a MLA request that does not seek coercive measures such as information on bank records. Asset restraint and seizure requests can be executed quickly by using domestic restraint/seizure statutes.

465. From the years 2013-2017, Chinese Taipei received 102 requests for assistance in criminal matters. Of these, 16 requests are related to ML offences and 56 related to ML predicates. 87% of the 102 requests have been fulfilled.

Table 8.1: MLA requests received and sought (jurisdictions other than China)

Type of Request	No. of Requests Received						No. of Requests made					
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (Jan-Jun)	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (Jan-Jun)
Total	15	17	25	29	16	23	29	32	52	51	47	35
ML	2	3	3	3	3	2	1	0	5	5	0	2
Predicates	9	10	13	19	5	16	19	16	32	40	41	29
Requests Fulfilled	13	17	24	26	8	5	21	15	34	24	10	0
Refused	2	0	1	2	1	0	5	0	5	4	2	0

466. Chinese Taipei received and sought a large number of successful MLA requests with China, which is, to a degree, in keeping with the risk profile. Chinese Taipei's MLA and extradition with China operates under the Cross-Strait Joint-Fight against Crime and MLA Agreement, which entered into force in June 2009. From 2015-2017, there were more than 100 MLA cases between Chinese Taipei and China related to joint investigation and evidence gathering. Chinese Taipei responded to 533 incoming MLA requests from China in the same period.

467. Chinese Taipei largely provides international cooperation in line with its risk profile. Below is a table reflecting the jurisdictions with which Chinese Taipei has sought and provided cooperation.

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Table 8.2: Jurisdictions involved in Chinese Taipei's MLA cases (not including cases with China)

MLA provided by Chinese Taipei to foreign jurisdictions		Requests for MLA from Chinese Taipei to foreign jurisdictions	
Jurisdiction	No. of MLA cases	Jurisdiction	No. of MLA cases
USA	23	USA	74
Poland	13	UK	20
Vietnam	9	Philippines	19
Switzerland	8	Vietnam	14
Australia	6	Singapore	11
Germany	5	Australia	6
South Korea	2	South Africa	4
		Spain	3
Total	66	Total	151
Cases: ML, drug trafficking, corruption, taxation offences, forgery of documents, fraud, breach of trust, human trafficking		Cases: ML, drug trafficking, corruption, forgery of documents, fraud, obstruction of freedom, copyright Act, human trafficking.	

468. Chinese Taipei provided a number of case studies in which MLA was provided to high quality in a timely way. Some of these matters are still on-going and cannot be published.

Case Example 8.1: Asset Recovery

Chinese Taipei prosecuted its former President for corruption-related charges and ML. The former first family, with received bribe payments, used Hong Kong, China and Swiss bank accounts, British Virgin Island companies and a St. Kitts and Nevis trust to purchase two real properties located in the United States. The United States initiated two civil forfeiture actions and ultimately forfeited the properties as a result of a settlement. Chinese Taipei provided critical assistance ranging from information sharing via both MLA and law enforcement channels, witness interviews etc. After forfeiture, the United States sold the properties and obtained approximately \$1.5 million in proceeds, which was returned to Chinese Taipei in 2016.

469. Chinese Taipei has demonstrated, in various actual cases, that it has taken positive action on the request for assistance from other countries by freezing and seizing assets; searching for and seizing physical evidence; and extraditing the offenders. For example, in response to a MLA request from the United States, Chinese Taipei has seized over USD15 million in drug proceeds involved in large scale trade-based ML schemes. In another case, based on an MLA request from Australia related to drug smuggling, Chinese Taipei provided a wide range of assistance in aid of the Australian investigation, resulting in the arrest of a number of drug offenders including the main target in the case.

470. One untested challenge to the provision of constructive assistance is Chinese Taipei's ability to share forfeited assets based on a MLA request from other jurisdictions. Chinese Taipei has never shared forfeited assets with another jurisdiction as Chinese Taipei advised that it to date has not received a request for sharing.

471. Chinese Taipei, to date, has not received any incoming extradition requests while it has sent three outgoing extradition requests. Chinese Taipei has an extradition treaty with six countries and the majority of the requests have been executed in the form of repatriation or deportation.

Case Example 8.2: Extradition/deportation of Murder Suspects

In aid of a murder investigation in Hong Kong, China in the absence of a specific request from Hong Kong, China - Chinese Taipei spontaneously revoked three suspects Chinese Taipei's entry permits for deportation, and promptly notified the relevant authority in Hong Kong, China of their pending deportation. Chinese Taipei requested the Hong Kong, China authorities of to escort the suspects back to Hong Kong, China.

Table 8.3: Extradition/Repatriation/Deportation from 2014-June 2018

Type	Agency	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (Jan-Jun)	Total
Chinese Taipei locals repatriated	NPA	51	74	49	54	30	258
	MJIB	0	1	1	79	11	92
Foreigners reported	MJIB	1	1	2	4	1	9
	NIA	2	0	1	0	0	3

472. Under the Cross-Strait Joint-Fight against Crime and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement, repatriation and deportation of wanted individuals has been achieved between Chinese Taipei and China. From 2013-2017, Chinese Taipei received 13 repatriation requests from China, 8 of which have been executed and completed; during the same period, Chinese Taipei has sent 730 repatriation requests to China, 220 which have been responded to.

473. Chinese Taipei seeks MLA in an appropriate and timely manner. Chinese Taipei provided seminars for prosecutors and law enforcement in regards to the use of formal MLAs; MOJ proactively contacts the district prosecutors' office if a MLA request is needed; After the enactment of Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matter Act in May 2018, MOJ's website includes templates for MLA requests for various purposes and the information on the countries with which Chinese Taipei has a bilateral MLA or an extradition agreement.

474. The case studies provided by Chinese Taipei demonstrate that it seeks MLA requests generally in line with its risk profile – proactively seeking MLA assistance to pursue domestic predicates while less enterprisingly to pursue international assistance for ML violations. For instance, in 2017 Chinese Taipei sent 47 outgoing MLA requests, of which 41 related to ML predicates, however, none related to ML.

Case Example 8.3: Prosecution of Corruption and Ongoing Asset Recovery Action

Mr. W, an arms broker, and Mr. K, a Chinese Taipei military officer, obtained of kickbacks, approximately USD516 million, through a purchase of Lafayette frigate made by Chinese Taipei in 1989. Mr. K was prosecuted under the Anti-Corruption Act. Chinese Taipei sent a MLA request to Switzerland where Mr. K's corruption proceeds were located, requesting the restraint and later repatriation of the corruption proceeds. Switzerland executed the request and repatriated the assets back to Chinese Taipei who forfeited the assets upon Mr. K's conviction. Mr. W used his family members' accounts to launder the corruption proceeds and transferred the proceeds to various jurisdictions including Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Austria, Jersey, Luxembourg, and Isle of Man. Chinese Taipei sought MLA from the aforementioned countries to restraint the accounts. The jurisdictions froze funds amounting to USD1.084 billion. Chinese Taipei's court of first instance in 2017 issued a forfeiture judgment in the amount of approximately USD900 million.



475. Pursuant to the Joint-fight against Crime and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement with China, Chinese Taipei has actively engaged in joint investigations with 5 provincial level entities in China including Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangsu. From 2014-2017, the MJIB sent 30 requests to China regarding investigation and evidence gathering. Out of these requests, 24 cases involved telecommunications fraud, 1 case related to narcotics, and 5 cases related to other economic crimes.

Seeking other forms of international cooperation for AML/CFT purposes

476. Chinese Taipei regularly seeks other forms of international cooperation in an appropriate and timely fashion for AML/CFT purposes. Chinese Taipei maintains a global network of law enforcement attachés who seek and provide international cooperation as needed. These representatives were able to directly engage in communication and cooperation with their foreign counterparts, thereby resulting in a more dynamic and constructive process.

477. These attachés seek assistance for the investigations and prosecutions that are generally consistent with the risk profile of Chinese Taipei. Where multiple agencies’ efforts are involved and agencies’ jurisdiction on investigations overlap, the law enforcement attaché who started the investigation will usually take lead and guide a joint investigation. When the investigation is viable and ready, the law enforcement attachés will contact the relevant district prosecutors’ office and at that point the prosecutor assigned to the case will coordinate and direct the investigation.

Table 8.4: Chinese Taipei’s Global Network in aid of International Cooperation


Agency	Officers Assigned Abroad	No. of Jurisdictions/Region
MJIB	26	20
NPA	10	10
NIA	26	20
CGA	3	2
CA	2	2
FSC	6	2
MOEA	150	50

478. *FIU cooperation* - ALMD is a member of the Egmont Group, and plays an important international collaboration role for exchange of financial intelligence using the Egmont Secured Web (ESW) on behalf of domestic agencies. As of the onsite, Chinese Taipei has MOUs or agreements on AML/CFT intelligence exchange with 46 countries. Chinese Taipei advised that AMLD, on average, was able to complete each request within 22 days.

479. From 2014- to June 2018, AMLD engaged in 1,250 intelligence exchanges with 155 FIUs in 348 cases. Out of the 348 cases, AMLD received requests on 210 cases, made requests in 138 cases based on the needs for STR analysis or on behalf of domestic LEAs and prosecutors’ offices, and spontaneously shared intelligence on 96 cases. The majority of request were made to Hong Kong, China; the United States; and Singapore and predominately related to fraud and stock market crimes.

Table 8.5: Statistics – Outgoing Requests by AMLD and LEAs

Authority	Request/Execution	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (Jan-Jun)
<i>Financial Intelligence Unit</i>						
AMLD	Cases	20	49	34	21	14
	Requests made	70	228	165	87	60
	Granted(case)	20	45	32	21	13



	Denied (case)	0	0	0	0	1
	Pending (case)	0	4	2	2	2
Law Enforcement Authorities						
MJIB	Requests made (cases)	125	190	115	118	103
	Granted	101	156	46	74	76
	Denied	0	0	0	1	0
	Pending	24	34	69	43	27
AAC	Requests made (cases)	2	7	3	1	1
	Granted	2	7	3	1 processing	1 processing
	Denied	0	0	0	0	0
	Pending	0	0	0	0	0
NPA(CIB)	Requests made	68	127	125	130	56
	Granted	11	30	2	45	10
	Denied	14	16	14	3	3
	Pending	43	81	109	82	46
NIA	Requests made (cases)	6	4	11	6	
	Granted	6	4	11	6	
	Denied	0	0	0	0	
	Pending	0	0	0	0	




Case Example 8.4: Prosecution achieved through other forms of International Cooperation

In July 2016 a hacking occurred of an overseas branch of Bank F’s computer system, which gained access to the bank’s internal network and a specific model of ATM. Investigations found that an international criminal group comprised of 22 suspects from 9 countries were involved and a few members of the group arrived in Chinese Taipei after the initial hack and gained control of 41 ATMs in 22 branches of the Bank on July 10 and 11, 2016. The criminal activity caused the ATMs to automatically dispense cash bills, totalling NTD 83.27 million (approx. USD2.74 million). IB investigations led to the arrest of suspects in Chinese Taipei within 5 days.

MJIB identified the IP address of the unknown server in jurisdiction S that was used by the group to establish irregular connection with Bank F’s overseas branch audio service mainframe to crack the access password. AMLD assisted MJIB investigating fund flows between related parties before and after the case, and monitored subsequent transactions. Money mules who were used in the case were foreign nationals. AMLD obtained cooperation from foreign FIUs through ESW to obtain criminal records, STRs or CTRs and financial records associated with the foreign suspects and shared the financial intelligence with MJIB. Chinese Taipei’s intelligence resulted in the arrest of the main suspects in March 2018 in jurisdiction S and unravelled an international cybercrime group, a notorious Eastern European hacker group, who had hacked into the banking systems in multiple countries and then laundered funds. This group was wanted by the police in multiple countries.

In September 2016, Taipei District Prosecutors Office charged the 3 main suspects with various criminal offenses and issued circular orders to 19 money mules involved in the case. In January 2017, Taipei District Court sentenced the defendants to 5 years of imprisonment and an additional fine of NT\$600,000(about USD20,000). They will be deported after serving their sentence.

480. Chinese Taipei is able to provide and seek various forms of assistance by LEAs and AMLD prior to transmission of a MLA request, and therefore, a mixed use of informal and formal forms of assistance in an appropriate and timely manner significantly enhanced the effectiveness of Chinese Taipei’s international cooperation. MJIB made outgoing requests in 651 cases between 2014 and June 2018.



481. AAC has close collaboration mechanisms with foreign counterparts in 8 jurisdictions. Between 2014 and 2017 the AAC exchanged intelligence in 36 cases and made 13 outgoing requests. Case examples were provided to the team demonstrating the utility of these requests.

482. CGA makes regular use of its liaison officers stationed in Tokyo, Okinawa and Manila and has established communication channels with 16 agencies in 9 jurisdictions including China, the United States, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and a number of SE Asian jurisdictions. A total of 390 requests were made from CGA to China from 2014 to 2017.

483. CA has liaison officers in the United States and Japan. CA has entered into 7 agreements, 6 arrangements and 4 MOUs on customs cooperation with 16 countries or jurisdictions including the European Union (EU), and established and developed communication and cooperation with foreign customs authorities in over 20 jurisdictions. From 2014-2017, CA completed 1,013 cases related to customs investigations with 24 foreign partners. In particular, CA cooperated with the customs authority in 3 countries for drug trafficking cases and seized 144 kg of drugs, and 133.5kg of smuggled gold.

484. NIA has 27 liaison officers dispatched to various jurisdictions aligned with risk, signed 19 cooperation agreements/MOUs. NIA has completed intelligence exchanges in 27 cases with foreign immigration authorities.

485. *Tax Administration co-operation* - The MOF (Taxation) has entered into 32 tax agreements which provides for authority for information exchange. From 2014-2017, TA completed 13 cases of information exchange on tax matters with the competent authorities in 6 countries.

486. *FSC co-operation* - FSC has used a range of means to pursue information exchange. FSC has overseas representative offices in the United Kingdom and the United States. FSC has entered into 55 MOUs, EOLs, or protocols with 37 foreign supervisory authorities. FSC is a signatory to the IOSCO MMOU and IAIS MMOU. From 2014-2017, FSC, under various frameworks, completed 577 intelligence exchanges with foreign supervisory authorities of 25 jurisdictions and these appear to be comprehensive and timely. The most information exchanged with foreign banking supervisors are concern fit and proper tests of major shareholders or senior management of banks. Information exchange with foreign securities supervisors are generally related to securities frauds, insider trading, etc. FSC pursues regular exchange with foreign insurance supervisors. Processing time for its insurance sector to complete incoming requests ranges from 8 to 44 days depending on the complexity of the requests.

487. *BOAF and Central Bank cooperation* - any international cooperation sought in relation to records held by BOAF or the Central Bank would be obtained via either the FSC or AMLD and then provided to international partners.

Providing other forms international cooperation for AML/CFT purposes

488. Chinese Taipei is able to provide many forms of assistance before receiving a request for MLA through its network of LEA attachés posted abroad. Requests for ordinary investigative assistance and intelligence exchange can be made by foreign counterparts to the attachés who will in turn pass the information request to domestic agencies. Chinese Taipei LEAs play a very active role in information sharing as well as spontaneously exchange intelligence with their foreign counterparts. The table below shows the number of requests received and their execution by ALMD and each LEA from 2014-June, 2018.

Case Example 8.5: Arrest and assets seized achieved as a result of both MLA and other forms of International Cooperation

An investigation identified numerous remittances had been made to jurisdiction U and jurisdiction D. The LEA attaché stationed in jurisdiction D was tasked to monitor the movements of the individuals who made remittances. The DPO submitted MLA requests to jurisdiction U and jurisdiction D for relevant transactions. AMLD joined the investigation and issued letters to retrieve account information, transaction details, and related vouchers from several dozen of FIs. A lot of cash proceeds were found to have been transferred overseas. AMLD analysed CTRs and forex records retrieved from the Central Bank. AMLD also made a series of requests over ESW to foreign FIUs, and disseminated detailed analysis reports to the Prosecutors Office.

The investigation uncovered an overseas call centre established by fraud perpetrators in jurisdiction D. MJIB contacted jurisdiction D's judicial department for assistance. MJIB, CIB and the prosecutors visited jurisdiction D and reached agreement with the relevant authorities on cooperation, after which a formal MLA request was made to jurisdiction D. The investigation further discovered that the main suspect was also under investigation for ML by the jurisdiction D's prosecutors. In September 2017, jurisdiction D conducted search warrants on properties of the main suspect and his associates and arrested the phone scam suspects and seized key evidences including computers and training manuals. Four Chinese Taipei suspects in this case were escorted back to Chinese Taipei by the LEA officers. The case is still under investigation by authorities in charge of this case.

Table 8.6: Incoming requests by AMLD and LEAs

Authority	Request/Execution	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (Jan-Jun)
Financial Intelligence Unit						
AMLD	Cases received	32	48	50	60	20
	Requests received	89	144	168	168	71
	Granted (case)	32	48	50	60	21
	Denied (case)	0	1	0	0	0
	Spontaneous	6	9	26	45	10
Law Enforcement Authorities						
MJIB	Requests received (case)	77	129	91	129	119
	Granted	77	129	91	128	119
	Denied	0	0	0	1	0
	Spontaneous (case)	167	149	134	184	155
AAC	Requests received (case)	1	9	6	7	2
	Granted	1	9	6	7	2
	Denied	0	0	0	0	0
NPA (CIB)	Requests received	57	89	93	123	42
	Granted	57	89	93	123	25 (processing)
	Denied	0	0	0	0	0

489. Chinese Taipei's LEAs focus on offenses related drug trafficking and telecommunication fraud, and have conducted joint investigations with China, Hong Kong, China and other Southeast Asian countries in line with the risk profile identified by the NRA. The following is a table on the joint investigations by Chinese Taipei's LEAs and other jurisdictions. The team was provided details of the jurisdictions with which cooperation was provided in these cases and confirm that they are all in line with Chinese Taipei's risk profile.



Table 8.7 – examples of assistance provided by MJIB and NPA to partner jurisdictions

Year	Cases	Type of Offence	Suspects arrested
MJIB			
2014	9	Drug Trafficking, Pharmaceutical Affairs Act, Fraud	65
2015	6	Drug Trafficking	32
2016	11	Drug Trafficking, Securities and Exchange Act	29
2017	5	Drug Trafficking	35
2018 (Jan-Jun)	6	Drug Trafficking, Telecommunications Fraud	53
NPA (CIB)			
2014	13	Telecommunications fraud, Drug Trafficking	153
2015	23	Telecommunications Fraud, Drug Trafficking	372
2016	47	Telecommunications Fraud, counterfeiting, BEC fraud, drug trafficking	816
2017	25	Telecommunications Fraud and drug trafficking	335
2018 (Jan-Jun)	47	Telecommunications Fraud and drug trafficking	340



International exchange of basic and beneficial ownership information of legal persons and arrangements

490. Chinese Taipei shares basic and BO information of legal persons and arrangements, however, it can only share information that is available under Chinese Taipei law (see I05). Basic information is publicly available on a website established by MOEA. MOJ, AMLD, MJIB, NPA, and TA have responded to requests related to BO information during the assessment period. MOJ’s formal request related to the BO information from the information exchange by LEAs. LEAs’ assistance provided on BO information includes their efforts in searching information available in public sources and law enforcement-sensitive portals, as well as issuance of a letter of request to the banks involved or the relevant governmental agencies requesting the BO information. If needed, LEAs can also provide BO assistance by requesting submission of voluntary interviews of individuals who may hold such information. Between 2014 to 2017 SFB/FSC responded to 33 requests related to BO information for regulatory enforcement of security market law with an average time frame for response ranging from 30 to 60 days. SFB/FSC’s SOP requires SFB to provide BO information as well as the information regarding money flows when responding a BO-related request. TA provides assistance through public records search, and statements of business income tax filed by legal entities with TA, and such assistance in the tax-related matters was provided under tax agreements signed between Chinese Taipei and foreign jurisdictions.




Table 8.8 Statistics on Requesting or Providing BO Information

Authority/ Year		2014	2015	2016	2017	2018 (Jan-Jun)
MLA requests						
MOJ	Requests Received	0	1	1	0	
	Requests Made	2	1	4	1	
FIU						
AMLAD	Requests Received	18	27	31	36	10
	Requests Made	14	30	16	15	10
LEAs						
MJIB	Requests Received	3	2	1	1	0
	Requests Made	10	7	6	1	1
NPA	Requests Received	6	2	4	3	3
	Requests Made	16	8	3	0	3
Supervisory Authority						
FSC	Requests Received	7	5	12	9	2
	Requests Made	9	5	6	6	3
Other Competent Authorities						
MOF	Requests Received	3	1	0	0	0
(Tax)	Requests Made	0	0	0	0	0



Overall conclusion on Immediate Outcome 2

491. Chinese Taipei authorities place a strong priority on obtaining and providing international cooperation in line with its risk profile despite the challenges it faces due to longstanding issues. Authorities have taken proactive and novel steps to overcome obstacles to international cooperation and have established numerous channels and initiatives to seek and to provide international cooperation in line with the risk profile to achieve operational outcomes.

492. **Chinese Taipei has a substantial level for effectiveness for Immediate Outcome 2.**